This article proposes that venture capitalists adds value within portfolio firms by transferring information about senior managers across firms -A valuable feature since it is difficult to transfer information about senior managers in small firms in a systematic fashion. This transfer occurs on a significant scale because venture capitalists operate a network, within which they are involved in locating and relocating managers. Theoretical and empirical analyses indicate that the factors relevant to explain the intensity with which venture capitalists network include: 1) the value of the information transmitted through the network 2) the difficulty found to entice executives to manage firms funded with venture capital; and 3) the gains that the venture capitalists who suggest managers can obtain when enticing managers to accept job offers.
Introduction
The importance of small businesses in creating jobs and spurring inovation has brought attention to the financing of growth companies. Venture capital 1 is specialized in the financing of entrepreneurial companies. It has been very successful in funding some of the most dynamic American enterprises such as Microsoft, Cisco, Intel, Compaq, Federal Express, Apple Computers, Genentech, and Amazon.com. About 30% of the companies that go public in the US received venture capital resources [Gompers and Lerner (1997) ]. These results become even more impressive when we consider that the amount of capital raised by institutional venture capitalists in the United States between 1978 and 1997 has averaged less than $3 billion per year and never exceeded $7 billion until 1997 (compare this with an almost $8 trillion GDP and nearly $1 trillion in gross domestic fixed investment). These remarkable figures have motivated inquires about the benefits of venture capital.
Most studies on the roles of venture capital have focused on its financial design and information-based roles: allocation of control rights, and effectiveness in ameliorating adverse selection and moral hazard problems [Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) , Amit, Glosten, and Muller (1990) , Chan (1983) , Cornelli and Yosha (1997) , Hellman (1998) , Marx (1998) , Repullo e Suarez (2000)]. In these papers, venture capital becomes a financial contract designed to give investors the necessary control, remunerate them for the high risk they assume, and solve incentive problems. Sahlman (1990) describes venture capital as an institution shaped to screen projects and provide monitoring [Gompers (1995) and Lerner (1995) present an empirical analysis of this last issue]. By being actively involved within the firms they fund, venture capitalists have access to information and mechanisms that enable them to deal with adverse selection and moral hazard. As consequence, venture capitalists can provide financing to young businesses that otherwise would not receive external resources [Barry (1994) ]. In this way, the development of the venture capital industry brings the financial benefit of extending external funds to entrepreneurial companies. Does venture capital also bring non-financial benefits? Is it advantageous for some firms to be funded with venture capital, or they turn to venture capital sources only when they would otherwise face capital rationing? There is anecdotal evidence that because venture capitalists frequently specialize in a particular technology or stage of development can offer strategic, technical, and commercial guidance [Barry (1994) , Byers (1997) , Bygrave e Timmons (1992), Sahlman (1990) , Sapienza (1992) ]. However, to date, little standard research has been devoted to non-financial benefits of venture capital.
A notable exception is the recently published paper by Hellmann and Puri (2002) , who show that venture capital influences the internal organization of portfolio firms. In particular, they show that venture backed companies are faster to bring in outsiders as CEOs, and that this effect is more noticeable at the very early stage.
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However, these authors present no reasoning for why venture capital brings these advantages.
Our study presents a clear cost-benefit argument and corroborating empirical evidence of the importance of venture capital as human resources management. Good management is essencial for the success of young, fast-growing enterprises. The potentialities of an entrepreneurial firm certainly depend on its capacity to recruit managers. Therefore, different financiers may have different efficacy depending on their impact on the ability of the financed firms to attract efficient managers. This article argues that venture capital brings non-financial benefits to new projects because it allows the transfer of valuable information acquired in previous investments. More specifically, this work focuses on the transfer of one particular form of information crucial to new firms -the abilities and qualification of senior managers -that endows firms funded with venture capital with superior management. This transfer of information is accomplished through an informal network of venture capitalists, within which they are involved in locating and relocating managers. This feature is unique, mainly because it is difficult to transfer information about senior managers of small and medium companies in a systematic fashion. Venture capitalists can redeploy or reffer competent officers when their companies do not develop into independent organizations. For managers, this works as an insurance. This can explain the finding in Hellmann and Puri (2002) that the effect of venture capital in bringing outsider CEOs is stronger for firms in their early stages (when the prospects for senior managers is highly risky).
The conclusions in this article are based on a nationwide survey of venture capitalists. The survey results confirm the existence of the network: a majority of the venture capitalists confirm that their relationships with their colleagues include acting on their suggestions when hiring managers, and in turn recommending managers to each other. A substantial proportion of venture capitalists affirm that they adopt the strategy of recycling managers in their portfolio firms. Theoretical arguments postulate and econometric analysis supports that the decision to join the network can be explained by factors such as: the subjective risk venture capitalists attribute to their investments; the value of the information transmitted through the network; the size of their funds; and the difficulty that venture capitalists find in recruiting managers. In addition, venture capitalists' motivation to network also depends on possible gains when hiring managers due to the reputation they can acquire for assisting managers with job placement.
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the features of private equity financing that allow venture capitalists to add value within the portfolio firm by transferring valuable information across firms. Section A models the decision to network. Section 4 presents the survey and relates some of the survey data to the variables in the model. An empirical analysis of the incentives to network guided by the model previously developed is presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes this article.
Adding value through the transfer of information
In this section, we outline how a mature private equity industry provides venture capitalists with the opportunity to transfer information from past investments to new firms. First, we develop some useful analitical concepts.
Organizational capital
Two firms holding the same tangible assets can be valued differently. An explanation for this discrepancy is that firms have intangible, non-tradable assets. The economics of transaction costs casts light on the nature of such non-tradable assets. Broadly speaking, transaction costs encompass a spectrum of institutional costs including those of, negotiating, drawing up and enforcing contracts, monitoring performance, and changing institutional arrangements. Following the transaction cost approach, economic organizations and their contractual arrangements result from the minimization of specific transaction costs [Williamson (1986) ]. In view of transaction costs, the value of a firm depends on its ability to efficiently contract with its suppliers, customers, employees, etc.
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Many of the contracts between the firm and its suppliers, customers, and employees involve principal-agent problems in the context of uncertainty. Therefore, the contract design depends on the information that the parties involved in it have about each other. This becomes even more complex in a context of teams [Holmstrom (1982) ]. Therefore, the firm's ability to contract, and consequently its efficiency, depends on the information it has, not only about individual agents (employees, customers, and suppliers), but also about the synergy existing among the agents involved, and on the information that these agents have about the firm. Thus, part of the value of a firm comprises "assets" that are intangible and idiosyncratic.
Among these idiosyncratic assets are the institutional arrangements made inside the firm, its ability to contract efficiently given certain information, its knowledge about the parties involved in the contracts, its reputation (i.e., the information different agents have about the firm), etc. We will call such assets, organizational capital. In general, organizational capital is intangible, nontradable, and difficult to transmit. When a firm shuts down, most of its organizational capital is lost. We will argue that a mature venture capital industry has the unique feature of fostering venture capitalists with the opportunity to transfer organizational capital across firms.
The transfer of organizational capital
The goal in venture capital financing is profit through capital gains. Potential candidates for venture capital resources must have the prospect of producing large capital gains in a relative short period of time (usually, firms with the potential to become publicly traded). Therefore, firms suitable to receive venture capital funds are typically high-risk. More importantly, these firms are characterized by a high degree of asymmetric information. Managers frequently have more accurate information about the prospects of the firm than they may be willing to reveal. For instance, they generally lack the incentive to liquidate a project with dim prospects as long as others are providing capital. This information asymmetry makes project governance extremely important. Among the mechanisms venture capitalists adopt to deal with this problem are close monitoring and staging of the investment [Sahlman (1990) , Gompers (1995) , and Lerner (1995) ]. Typically, the project is divided into stages. At every financing round, venture capitalists invest only the capital necessary to take the firm to the next stage of development. They monitor the firm closely and, at every round of financing, decide whether or not to continue funding the firm.
To increase the likelihood of success and improve their information about the quality of projects, venture capitalists frequently become actively involved in the operation of their portfolio firms. For example, they sit on the board of directors, fire 4 and recruit managers, help establish business strategies, provide industry knowledge, structure deals with suppliers and customers, and act as confidants to managers [Sahlman (1990) ]. Because many of the firms suitable to receive venture capital funds are young companies lacking experience in human resources management, venture capitalists often become involved in selecting, recruiting and properly remunerating key employees.
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This involvement of venture capitalists within portfolio firms also provides venture capitalists with expertise in selecting, recruiting, and properly remunerating managers, as well as in timing the development of the firms as organizations (e.g., deciding when is the right time to add a professional CEO or CFO, etc.). Furthermore, this involvement gives venture capitalists non-public information about the abilities and qualifications of the managers in the firms they fund.
Even though venture capitalists fund firms with potential to become publicly traded, more often than not, their investments end when their portfolio firms are either liquidated, merge, or are acquired by larger corporations. For example, Venture Economics (1988) reports that 34,5% of venture capital investments resulted in losses (result based on a sample of 383 companies funded 13 venture capital partnerships between 1969 and 1985) . Black and Gilson (1998 ) presents data from 1984 to 1996 showing that a significant part of the venture capital investments exits through acquisitions. In these cases, the portfolio firm generally becomes a division of the acquiring corporation and does not need a senior management team. Therefore, in many cases, senior managers have limited viability in firms funded with venture capital, and leave their companies when they are sold or liquidated (this is not necessarily so if the firm goes public). The limited viability of senior managers in firms funded with venture capital means that many portfolio firm managers are available for repeat hire by venture capitalists.
The nature of the involvement of venture capitalists within their portfolio firms provides them with the necessary conditions to transfer organizational capital from one firm to another. Among other things, they can transfer the knowledge they acquire about suppliers, customers, and the management team of the companies they fund. When they exit an investment, they have the possibility of recycling competent managers by rehiring them to manage other firms in their portfolio. Venture capitalists also bring to a project the expertise they develop in selecting, recruiting, and remunerating managers, and in timing the development of the companies as organizations.
"The network has been buttressed by the "CEO-in-residence" program which brings temporarily out-of-work top executives into Kleiner and Perkins to review business plans, to do a little strategic thinking and help with recruiting..."
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Another specific manner of transferring organizational capital is related to the way venture capitalists deal with managerial incentives. Managers in small growing firms are exposed to high risk. As mentioned before, senior managers find themselves in a vulnerable situation when the firm does not go public. The fact that venture capitalists can possibly offer another chance in another portfolio firm reduces the firm-specific risk that managers bear. Indeed, Hellmann and Puri (2002) provide empirical evidence that venture backed companies are faster to bring in outsiders as CEOs. Therefore, it may be that firms funded with venture capital have an advantage when recruiting managers because of the "insurance" that venture capitalists can offer -we will refer to this as "the insurance effect."
This article focuses on two particular ways that venture capitalists can transfer organization capital: the transfer of information about the qualification of senior managers and the "insurance effect". Both of these mechanisms depend on the possibility of consecutively employing managers in distinct portfolio firms. The possibilities of the same venture capitalist redeploying the same managers is somewhat restricted since few venture capital funds are large enough to match job openings with the availability of managers.
9 However, one factor that broadens the transfer of organization capital is the close relationship among venture capitalists, which is an outgrowth of the syndication of investments.
Syndication of investments is a strategy that venture capitalists commonly use to improve the screening, achieve better monitoring, guarantee sources of funds to specific projects, and diversify their portfolio [Lerner (1994) ]. The possibilities for syndication depend on both the connections a venture capitalist has, and on his or her reputation among other venture capitalists. Syndication is especially important for the transfer of organizational capital. It creates strong bonds among venture capitalists and, therefore, allows reliable information to flow among them. The syndication of investments broadens the transfer of organizational capital because it allows the transfer to occur across firms in the portfolio of different venture capital funds. The fact that reliable information can flow among venture capitalists gives them an unusual role as certifiers of senior managers' abilities (in the context of small growth firms financing).
10 This reasoning suggests that venture capitalists operate an informal net- June-1996), p.96. 9 In telephone interviews, some venture capitalists reported that they recycle efficient managers whenever there are opportunities for that. Nonetheless, their funds are not large enough to allow the systematic recycling of managers.
10 An anonymous referee has noticed that a similar network may exist among institutional investors, banks, work to locate and relocate skilled managers. The rest of this article is dedicated to the analysis of this previously unstudied network.
The Incentive to Network
The purpose of this section is to establish the main factors that affect venture capitalists' decision to participate in the network, i.e., their decisions to hire managers through the network, and to suggest managers to their colleagues. The argument to be hereby developed also shows that by networking, venture capitalists can undertake some projects that otherwise would not be viable. A formal version of these arguments is presented in Apendix A.
The exogenous structure
We asume that a venture capitalist has access to a project and must find a manager. Alternatively, we can think of the venture capitalist already involved in a project and deciding how to replace the current manager. The basic argument to be used in what follows is that the venture capitalist will conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether to use a network of venture capitalists or a headhunter to find managerial talent. The venture capitalist has to decide how to locate the manager. Because of the focus on the importance of venture capital investors when dealing with the managerial factor, we exclude the role of other insiders (entrepreneurs/founders) in that decision.
The venture capitalist establishes a desired profile for the manager. This profile includes verifiable characteristics such as experience, industry knowledge, etc. It also includes some unverifiable characteristics. This assumption introduces the idea that to manage a firm for venture capital investors may require special skills from managers, allowing to distinguish between different unverifiable types. For instance, firms funded with venture capital are characterized by fast growth. Very few managers can certify their ability to lead young, fast-growing firms into large, well-structured organizations. Successful managers in large corporations may lack that skill.
11 We assume that beforehand neither venture capitalists nor managers know managers' types.
and largeshareholders that seat on the board of public corporations. However, in the context of small growth firms financing, this feature seems unique to venture capital. When a firm is funded with other sources of capital, no other agent can play this certification role (systematically obtain private information about managers' abilities and credibly transmit it).
11 This point was exemplified by a venture capitalist on a telephone interview: "it is not the issue of managing a firm with $100 million in sales. The issue is to manage a firm that today sells $100 million and will sell $200 million in the near future."
The project can be a success but can also be a failure. Since there are different types of managers, we assume that the degree or probability of success increases with the quality of the management.
There are two possible ways of locating managers: through "headhunters" (search firms), and through a network operated by venture capitalists. Both means will result in locating a manager with the desired verifiable characteristics. However, the probability that the located manager located has the desired unverifiable characteristics change according to the mean used.
The cost of locating a manager depends on the mean used. The cost of hiring a search firm is assumed to be the same for all venture capitalists. To locate managers through the network, the venture capitalist needs to establish relations with other venture capitalists. The cost of networking is equivalent to the monetary value of the time that the venture capitalist has to spend establishing connections. Once the venture capitalists is networked, she has access to suggestions coming from her network colleagues. The cost of networking varies across venture capitalists depending on the potential for networking that each venture capitalist has, which in turn can be related to factors like the size of the venture capital fund, the number of partners, how much the venture capitalist syndicates investments, etc.
Managers have a reservation salary that is independent of their type.
12 Nonetheless, managers may be currently employed or unemployed, and that does affect their reservation salary. 13 We assume that the reservation salary of an employed manager is larger than the reservation salary of an unemployed manager. However, we make no assumption about the relative values of the probability that a manager is currently employed given that it has been located through a headhunter and the probability of employment given that it has been located through a network.
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The outcome of the project will become public information and influence the future salary that the manager expect to obtain in his or her next job. If the firm fails, the manager's future salary will be lower than in case of success. We assume that both values are independent of the means through which the manager has been located.
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12 Since neither managers nor venture capitalists know beforehand managers' type, it follows that the salary has to be independent of the type of the manager.
13 This dichotomy, employed/unemployed, could be replaced by any other that would make the reservation salary change. For instance this could be the willingness of managers to lead a firm of uncertain future existence, or manage a firm with very strong inside investors.
14 Given that venture capitalists would not recommend managers who are currently managing their own portfolio companies, it could be reasonable to assume that managers recommended by venture capitalists are likely to be unemployed. However, this aspect is not essential to the main points of this article.
15 This assumption simplifies the ideas in the sense that it is not necessary to calculate posterior probabil-Venture capitalists who network can assist managers with job placement by suggesting managers to other venture capitalists.
16 A possible future referral works as an option that managers acquire when they are hired.
17 If the project fails, with a given probability, the assistance can increase the future salary of the manager.
18 If the firm succeeds, this assistance has no effect on the future salary of the manager.
19 By suggesting managers venture capitalists incur a specific cost. This cost is equivalent to the monetary value of the effort and time that the venture capitalist has to spend contacting other venture capitalists to find a match for the managers. This cost varies according to venture capitalists' network connections.
Finally, it is assumed that managers are risk-averse and venture capitalists are riskneutral. 
The incentive analysis
Now that the exogenous structure was established, a possible procedure would be to specify under what conditions venture capitalists would either hire a headhunter or network. However, in practice venture capitalists generally use both, headhunters and network connections, to locate managers. What really changes is the frequency or intensity with which each alternative is used. In view of this, we will structure the solutions in terms of the incentive to network: the payoff the venture capitalist receives when the network is used, ities of the managers receiving either value. This calculation would be troublesome since it would depend on the number of recommendations the manager has received.
16 Only those who locate managers through the network have the option of actively suggesting managers. This sequenciality allows to model the idea that venture capitalists who suggest managers have an advantage when recruit managers because suggesting managers reduce the firm-specific risks to which managers are exposed (insurance effect).
17 Managers located through the network acknowledge the option of referral because they have been referred. Furthermore, venture capitalists who suggest managers can present evidence from their past records.
18 If the firm fails, the venture capitalist can improve the manager's situation by matching the manager with other venture capitalists who need a manager with the same qualifications. This approach assumes that the venture capitalist learn facts about managers that are not revealed through managers' records. The results in Table 5 support the plausibility of this assumption.
minus the payoff when a headhunter is hired.
21 In this way, the results from the model will be more convenient for empirical analysis. (The formal model can be found in Appendix A).
The decision to network involves two aspects: suggesting managers and acting on suggestions when hiring a manager. The two decisions are taken sequentially. First the venture capitalist decides whether or not to participate in the network by hiring managers under suggestion. Only in case of choosing to act on suggestions, the venture capitalist can choose between suggesting managers or not: the decision of acting on suggestions have no implication on the decision to suggest managers. However, the decision to suggest managers does affect the decision to act on suggestions because those who actively suggest managers have an advantage when recruiting managers: managers would accept a monetary salary below their reservation salary because the recommendation increases their expected future salary. The benefit that venture capitalists receive from suggesting managers can be incorporated by assuming that venture capitalists appropriate the whole gain from this activity. Therefore, in case the venture capitalist suggests managers through the network, the manager's reservation salary should be diminished by a given amount, so that the manager is indifferent between a situation with recommendation and a situation without recommendation. In this case, that amount represents the gain that the venture capitalists has by suggesting managers. The venture capitalist will suggest managers whenever the gain from this activity is larger than the costs associated with it. The incentive to suggest is thus the difference between the gain just described and the cost of suggesting.
We now determine how the incentive to suggest managers varies as a function of the value of the assistance increasing the future salary of the manager with a given probability, in case of failure. The result is straightforward. The value of the assistance depends on how effective it is. Since the assistance with job placement is effective only when the project fails, the higher the chances of failure, the higher the value managers attribute to the assistance, and the higher the discount on the reservation salary that they are willing to accept. Thus, the higher the assistance, the higher is the incentive to suggest managers.
The incentive to take suggestions can be decomposed into four factors. A first factor reflects how much the venture capitalist values the improvement in the quality of managers when these latter are located through the network, vis-à-vis headhunters (informational gain). The underlying intuition is that locating a good manager is important only if, the difference in the productivity of managers and the difference in the return of the project are large. If either of these factors is small, there is little value in locating good managers.
A second factor represents a gain (resp. loss), if managers located through the network present a lower (resp. higher) probability of being employed than those coming through headhunters.
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The third factor reflects the difference between the cost of networking and the cost of headhunting, and is related to how easily the venture capitalist can get suggestions.
The forth factor stands for the gain that the venture capitalist can obtain by assisting managers with job placement.
Finally, the firms that would be funded by venture capitalists who network, but not by those who hire through search firms are more likely to be (1) firms that are very risky ; and (2) firms for which the difference in managers productivity is high.
Such firms are most likely to be funded by venture capitalists who (1) believe that managers coming through the network are significantly more efficient; and (2) have low networking costs.
The Data
The lack of information about private investments is one of the main obstacles for research on venture capital. In principle, IPO prospectuses could provide quantitative data on the prevalence of recycling. However, IPO firms consist mostly of successful investments, and their senior managers in general are not available to be redeployed. Alternatively, data concerning the existence of the conjectured network among venture capitalists and providing relevant information to understand the motivations of those who join the network was obtained through two surveys of venture capitalists. The first (referred to as survey or large sample.) was answered by 160 venture capitalists and contains mostly qualitative information. The second (referred to as follow-up or small sample), with more quantitative questions had 68 answers. Creating these two new dataset through surveys brought the benefit of being able to match the exogenous structure in the model to observational variables.
The survey was sent to 879 venture capitalists throughout the US, randomly taken from "Pratt's Guide to Venture Capital Sources," a publication that lists all the venture capital sources and their managers. There were 160 answers. Among those, 70 agreed to a phone interview and a follow-up survey (we could reach only 68 of them). Through the interviews it was possible to identify 4 questionnaires answered by persons not directly involved in the investment process. These questionnaires were deleted. Therefore, the final sample consisted of 156 observations in the survey and 68 answers to the follow-up. Appendix B describes the sample and discusses possible biases. Table 1 describes the main variables.
Human Resources Management
In the survey, for an assessment of the importance that venture capitalists give to the activity of recruiting managers, the respondents were asked to rank the three activities performed by venture capitalists that they considered most important. They were given a menu including 1) monitoring performance against goals, 2) helping with management decisions, 3) providing industry knowledge, 4) providing finance, 5) developing business strategy, 6) recruiting managers, and two blank slots to complete with unlisted activities. A significant proportion, 16.7% listed recruiting managers as the most important activity; 35.5% as one of the two most important activities; and 54.2% as one of the three most important (Table 2 ). These numbers show that recruiting managers is an activity extremely valued by venture capitalists. Table 3 presents further data that characterize some aspects of venture capitalists' activities as human resources managers. For instance, this table presents the number of executives that the venture capitalist has employed more than once or helped with job placement and the number of CEOs replaced in the previous 5 years. The mode of the empirical distribution for replacement is 2. Of course, some venture capitalists are more active than others, and the number of replaced managers may be strongly affected by the number of deals of each venture capitalists. A more active one will tend to replace more managers. In order to correct that, we computed the variable AVERAGE REPLACEMENT (given as the number of replacements per deal), which is presented in the last part of Table 3 .
The Network
Quantitative and qualitative data concerning the existence of the network are presented in Table 4 . In panel A (qualitative data), venture capitalists were asked to show their agreement to the following propositions: 1) "venture capitalists operate informal networks involved in locating and relocating managers" (proposition NETWORK); 2) "it is common for me to suggest likely managers to others in the private equity industry" (proposition SUG-GEST); 3) "it is common for me to act on suggestions from others in the private equity industry when hiring a top manager for a firm" (proposition TAKE SUGGESTIONS); and 4) "once I learn about the good qualifications of a manager, I try to keep him/her working for companies I fund, i.e., I entice him/her to leave a firm when I sell or liquidate it and take a position in another company I fund " (proposition RECYCLING STRATEGY). Related to these points, the follow-up asked the numbers of managers that the venture capitalist had hired under recommendation and suggested in the previous 5 years both to/from partners and non-partners.
Venture capitalists strongly believed in the existence of the network. A large majority, 77.9%, agreed that they operate informal networks (proposition NETWORK, Table 4 , Panel A); only 6.5% disagreed.
Fully 56.2% agreed that it is common for them to suggest likely managers to others in the private equity industry; only 19.3% disagreed (proposition SUGGEST, Table 4 , Panel A).
23 In terms of quantitative data, the numbers in the follow-up (Table 4 , Panel B) confirm this result. Only 20.6% had not suggested any manager to a partners and 20.6% to nonpartners. Finally, the proportion of venture capitalists that had not recommended any manager amounts to 12.7%, while those who had recommended more than 4 adds to 52.7%.
Expressive 62.3%, agreed that it is common for them to act on suggestions when hiring managers (7.1% strongly agreed); only 11% disagreed (proposition TAKE SUGGESTIONS, Table 4 , Panel A).
24 The numbers in the follow-up (Table 4 , Panel B) are consistent with these results: only 19% of the respondents had not hired any manager under suggestion (30.5% had not hired any manager under suggestion of partners and 52.5%, from nonpartners). The proportion of those who hired more than 3 managers under recommendation adds to 30.2%. Finally, a considerable proportion of venture capitalists, 37%, affirm that they adopt the recycling strategy (proposition RECYCLING STRATEGY, Table 4 , Panel A).
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These results show that a significant proportion of venture capitalists suggest managers to each other, act on suggestions when hiring senior managers, and have a strategy to recycle managers. It is particularly striking that such a large proportion agree that venture capitalists operate informal networks involved in locating and relocating managers. These results endorse the general assumption that the network exists.
The Value of the Information
An important element that may explain the motivation that venture capitalists have in networking is the value that they attribute to the information that they obtain from each other. More specifically, venture capitalists have (or at least think to have) information about managers that search firms do not? Is this information really important for the success of their investment? If the answers to these questions are negative, then the exchange of information may simply be a way of lowering costs of recruitment.
The survey was designed to addres these issues. Venture capitalists were asked to express their agreement to the propositions: 1) "the success of the firms I fund depends mostly on their top managers" (proposition SUCCESS DEPENDS ON MANAGER); 2) "as a venture capitalists I learn substantially more about the managers of the companies I fund than what can be revealed to outsiders by their track records" (proposition INSIDE INFOR-MATION); and 3) "to manage a firm funded with venture capital requires different skills from those needed to manage a company funded with other sources of capital" (proposition DIFFERENT SKILL).
The level of agreement to these propositions is presented in Table 5 , Panel A: a massive majority of the respondents agreed that, through their relations with managers, they learn substancially more about the managers than what can be revealed to outsiders by the managers' records (proposition INSIDE INFORMATION). An even higher level of agreement is attained for the proposition SUCCESS DEPENDS ON MANAGERS. Finally, the majority agrees that to manage for venture capital investors require special skills (proposition DIFFERENT SKILL). This indicates that the information that venture capitalists acquire about managers is unique and valuable.
Recruiting Managers
The respondents also showed their agreement with some auxiliary propositions related to their activities as human resources recruiters (Table 5 , Panel B). These proositions are: 1) "it can be difficult to entice a manager to leave a stable position in a well established company and take a chance in a new firm with risky prospects" (proposition DIFFICULT HIRE); 2) "if it were not for their confidence in my personal commitments to them, some of the top managers of the companies I fund might not have accepted the job offer they received" (proposition PERSONAL COMMITMENTS); and 3) "having a reputation of helping good managers with job placement, in the event that the companies for which they work are liquidated, helps entice other managers to work for other companies I fund" (proposition REPUTATION).
Generally speaking, the data in Table 5 , Panel B, provides evidence that venture capitalists assume personal commitments and try to develop a reputation that allows them to replace managers from one company to another. One such reputation of helping managers with job placement can be important for venture capitalists only if managers recognize its value, assuming the role of an insurance effect. This shows that such reputation is relevant and thus provide indirect evidence of such insurance effect. Indeed, managers' replacement is an important and unavoidable part of venture capitalists' activities.
Characteristics of Venture Capitalists
The survey included questions that characterize venture capitalists according to 5 different aspects (see Table 6 ):
1. the three types of finance they are most dedicated to; 2. the subjective risk they assess of their investments; 3. the time they had been in the private equity industry; 4. the amount of capital their funds have under management; and 5. the number of deals the respondent had done in the previous 5 years.
Among these characteristics, a particularly important one for our description of the role of venture capitalists is the risk that each of them incurr. As described below, we develop two different ways of capturing that risk. The first one is related to the focus of the investment, whereas the second one is based on the subjective risk as it is perceived by the venture capitalist himself.
Concerning the types of financing, the respondents were asked to list the three types of financing with which they are primarily involved. They were given a menu including: seed, startup, R&D, first-stage, second-stage, mezzanine, LBO, acquisition financing, control block purchase industry consolidation, and a blank slot for other unlisted types of financing -this classification was taken from Venture Economic (1994). As there is no clear division between the types above, we grouped seed, startup, R&D and first-stage in the broader category early-stage. We then classified each venture capitalist according to the number of early-stage financing out of the three main types of financing in which he or she is mostly involved (variable, EARLY). Table 6 , Panel A, displays the characteristics of venture capitalists according to the type of financing.
The risk that venture capitalists face plays an important role in this study. In the absence of information of the riskiness of the portfolio of projects held by the venture capitalists, it was necessary to ask them for a subjective assessment of the riskiness of their investments (referred to as RISK).
26 This was accomplished with the following inquiry: "in the realm of venture capital, how would you classify most of your investments (use a scale from 1 for low risk to 5 for high risk)? " The results are presented in Table 6 , Panel A. As shown, variable RISK is relatively well distributed over the interval. As expected, RISK is strongly correlated with EARLY (the correlation coefficient is 0.67).
Regarding the time that venture capitalists had been in the private equity industry, among the respondents, 88.4% have been in the private equity business for more than 5 years and 56.8% for more than 10 years (Table 6 , Panel B, shows the distribution of venture capitalists according to the time they have been in the industry). With respect to the fund size, 27.2% of the respondents manage funds smaller than $50 million and 47.6% less than $100 million (details in Table 6 , Panel C).
Finally, Table 6 , Panel B, presents the distribution of venture capitalists according to the number of deals they had made in the previous 5 years. In some cases the venture capitalists had structured an unusually high number of deals in 5 years (larger than 30). Such large numbers raised suspicion that the data was related to the whole fund rather than to the individual venture capitalist. On phone interviews, I asked some respondents about these numbers. Some venture capitalists reported that they have assistants and trainees of venture capitalists who help them with their activities, nonetheless, the final decisions are taken by the venture capitalist in charge. In other cases, the respondent indicated that the answer given referred to the whole fund. In such cases, the answer was either corrected or considered blank.
Interplay Between Model and Data
The results in Tables 4 show that there is a considerable variation in the reaction that venture capitalists have about whether they suggest managers and/or act on suggestions when recruiting managers. This variation bolsters the empirical analysis motivated by the model, since it suggests cross-sectional variation, which can be linked to factors identified in 26 One potential problem that arises when a subjective measure is used is that each respondent arbitrarily sets a different scale. This prevents interpersonal comparison and makes the measure appear innocent. On the other hand, there are two arguments to justify its use, one conceptual and the other practical. The conceptual argument is that if riskiness of the investments have influence on a certain behavior, then the right variable to be used is the riskiness that the agents perceive, i.e., the subjective risk they assess. The practical argument is that there is no available data about the riskiness of individual investments made by venture capitalists.
Even though variable RISK appears amorphous it has a strong correlation with early-stage financingas it is expected from any measure of riskiness in venture capital investments [see Appendix B] . Although crude, the use of this subjective measure provides the first step in understanding the role of riskiness in determining venture capitalists' behavior. Moreover, as we will see, this measure turns out to be important in explaining the cross-sectional variation of other variables. the model. In what follows, we use propositions SUGGEST and TAKE SUGGESTIONS, and the number of managers hired under suggestion from non-partners and reccomended to non-partners as endogenous variables to verify the relevance of our explanation of the motivations that venture capitalists have to join the network. First, we relate the variables in the model to the propositions in the questinaire. As suggested by the incentive to network (expressions 8 and 16 and 17 in Apendix A) the factors relevant to understand the decision to network are:
1. the difference in productivity of managers; 2. the difference in the quality of managers coming through the network in comparison with those coming from search firms;
3. the difference in the reservation salary of managers employed in comparison with of those unemployed;
4. the difference in value of the project in cases of success and failure ;
5. the probability of failure that managers assess;
6. the value of the assistance;
7. the cost of networking vis-à-vis the cost using of search firms; and 8. the cost of suggesting managers. Table 7 summarizes the interplay between survey propositions and the exogenous variables listed above:
1. proposition SUCCESS DEPENDS ON MANAGERS is related to the differential in productivity: if the success depends mostly on managers, then there is a significant difference between having a suitable manager vis-à-vis having a not so suitable one. This implies that the more the success depends on managers, the larger is the differential in productivity (P 3. proposition DIFFICULT HIRE is related to the differential in reservation salaries: the more difficult it is to convince managers to leave their jobs, the higher the differential in their reservation salary due to the employed/unemployed factor (αR, in Apendix A);
4. proposition REPUTATION is a proxy for the assessment that venture capitalists have of the value that managers attribute to the assistance with job placement (I, in Apendix A). The reputation of helping managers with job placement can be important for venture capitalists only if managers recognize its value; and 5. EARLY and RISK (related to the term S − F , in Apendix A) 27 and to the probability of failure that managers assess (1 − P S , in Apendix A).
None of the variables in the survey are explicitly linked to the costs of networking (C D and C N in Appendix A). 28 However, there are some possible links between variables EARLY and RISK, and the amount of capital that the venture capital fund had under management (referred to as CAPITAL), and the costs of networking. Two conjectures relate the size of the venture fund to the costs of networking. First, large funds are managed by many venture capitalists. Therefore, the incidence of suggestions coming from partners or persons associated with them is more frequent. Secondly, other venture capitalists may have an interest in developing good relations with venture capitalists managing large funds. This may occur because of the interest that venture capitalists have in prospective syndications [Lerner (1994) ].
29 Moreover, well-established venture capitalists are opinion makers in the industry. Therefore, the flow of reliable suggestions to venture capitalists managing large funds can be more intense.
Variables RISK and EARLY may also be linked to the cost of networking since they are related to the syndication of investments. One of the reasons why venture capitalists syndicate their investment is risk diversification. Therefore, risk increases the intensity with which venture capitalists syndicate investments, which in turn creates strong bonds among venture capitalists and increases the flow of reliable information.
Empirical Analysis
Using this interplay between the model and the survey data, the incentive to suggest managers can be estimated as
27 When there are only two possible outcomes, S and F, the variance is given by (S − F ) 2 ¡ P − P 2 ¢ , where P is the probability of S.
while the incentive to take suggestions can be estimated as The difficulty in estimating the decision to suggest managers is that the decision to suggest managers appears as an explanatory variables. To obtain consistent estimators, a two-stage method was adopted: first we define a dummy variable, SUGGEST2, that assumes value 0 when the venture capitalist does not agree with proposition SUGGEST and 1 otherwise. Next, we run a probit regression of SUGGEST2 on RISK and REPUTATION, as specified in the incentive to suggest managers. We labeled the predicted values 30 in this probit as SUG. Then, we defined
30 The threshold was defined so that the number of predicted ones was equal to actual number of ones. Tables 8 and 9 present an empirical analysis of the incentive to hire under suggestions. Table 8 presents ordered probit regressions where the dependent variable is the agreement to proposition TAKE SUGGESTIONS, while Table 9 contais Poisson regressions where the dependent variable is the number of managers hired under suggestion from non-partners in the previous 5 years. In the Poisson regressions we included variables DEALS and HIRINGS as control. As expected, the difficulty in recruiting managers plays a positive role in making venture capitalists to network: variable DIFFICULT HIRE is consistently positive and statistically significant, This points out that concerns with costs of recruitment underlie the decision to locate managers through the network 31 .
Hiring under suggestions
The parameter associated with the variable DIFFERENT SKILLS is always positive and significant. Variable MANAGERS' IMPORTANCE is also positive and statistical significant as shown in Table 8 . This indicates that venture capitalists hire more under suggestions, the more differentiated the information transmitted through the network is, and also the more crucial the qualification of the managers is. This result is important since it corroborates our conjecture that the decision to network is related to the quality and relevance of the information, and it is not simply a way of lowering recruitment costs.
The more venture capitalists believe that the reputation of helping managers with job placement is important, the more they act on suggestion when recruiting managers:
31 Since we have no information about the probabilities of being employed conditional upon having been found through either a headhunter or a netwwork, we can not infer whether the effect is positive or negative. However, since the focus of this article is on the transfer organizational capital, this becomes a minor issue.
variable REPUTATION is always positive and present statistical significance. Its transforms (REPUT-EARLY and REPUT-RISK) are positive and significant in the large sample and negative, but insignificant in the small sample. This result supports the argument that venture capitalists add value by attracting managers because they reduce the firm-specific risk that managers face.
One also notes that our measures for riskiness (variables RISK and EARLY) present a positive role in inducing recruitment through the network. Variables EARLY present statistical significance in both samples, while variable RISK is significant only in the larger sample. Finally variable CAPITAL is positive and significant in the large sample, and negative and insiginficant in the small sample.
Suggesting managers
The empirical analysis of the decision to suggest managers is in Table 10 and Table 11 . Table 10 presents ordered probit regressions where the dependent variable is the agreement to proposition SUGGEST while Table 11 contains Poisson regressions where the dependent variable is the number of managers suggested to non-partners in the previous 5 years. In the Poisson regressions we included the variables DEALS and HIRINGS as control.
The decision to suggest managers can be seen to be strongly dominated by the risk and concerns with reputation. Variables EARLY, RISK and REPUTATIONS present sign positive and statistically significant. In the large sample, the other variables fail to preset statistical significance in accordance with the model. However, in the small sample we have varibles SPECIAL SKILLS and MANAGERS' IMPORTANCE negative and statistically significant. This apparently indicates that the more venture capitalist value managers, the more they try to keep them. In the small sample variable DIFFICULT HIRE present a positive and statistically significant sign. This suggests that the difficulty with recruitment may lead venture capitalist to develop a reputation of assisting managers.
Assisting and replacing managers
In the survey (large sample) we also asked the number of managers that the venture capitalists had replaced and assited with job placement in the previous 5 years. Poisson regressions in Tables 12 and 13 present an empirical analysis of these two activities. In Table 12 we observe that the number of managers assisted increases with the risk (variables EARLY and RISK) and with the importance attributed to the reputation of assisting managers (variable REPUTATION). These results reinforce the plausibility of the conjecture that venture capitalists can offer managers some sort of insurance against project-specific risk. One also notes that the number of managers assisted decreases with the importance attributed to managers and the difficulty with recruiting. However the sign of these two variables in these regressions present little relevance in our argument. Finally, we observe that the number of managers assisted increases with the number of deals (as expected) and with the seniority of the venture capitalist.
With respect to the number of managers replaced in the previous 5 years presented in Table 13 , one observes that those venture capitalists who attribute high importance to managers tend to replace managers less frequently (variable MANAGERS' IMPORTANCE is always negative and significant at the one percent level). This seems to indicate that when management is really important, to enter the deal, venture capitalists require the presence of a qualified manager, what reduces the future need of replacement 32 . As one would expect, the higher the risk, the more frequent replacements (variables RISK and EARLY are positive and highly significant): high risk demands more monitoring and prompt decisions. One also notes that seniority apparently makes venture capitalists less tolerant with management variable SENIORITY.
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Conclusion
A significant part of a firm's value -organizational capital -consists of nontradable and, in general, nontransferable knowledge and experience. Along with their investment activities, venture capitalists become actively involved within their portfolio firms and acquire part of these nontradable assets. Since they fund a continuous stream of firms, venture capitalists have the opportunity to transfer organizational capital across firms.
In this study, we confined the role of venture capitalists in transferring organizational capital to two aspects: the transfer of knowledge about the qualification of managers; and the control of the firm-specific managerial risk. This latter relates to how venture capitalists can reduce the risk that managers face in managing a company of uncertain future existence. This is accomplished by certifying managers' ability with other venture capitalists.
The transfer of information about the qualification of managers can be accomplished in two different ways: by a single venture capitalist consecutively employing the same manager in distinct portfolio firms (recycling managers); or by referrals from one venture capitalist to another. The first form does not require communication among venture capitalists, while the second form requires intense exchange of information among venture capitalists.
Through a nationwide survey, we obtained evidence that venture capitalists operate an informal network involved in locating and relocating managers: 77,9% of the respondents agree with the existence of the network. A majority of the venture capitalists affirm that it is common for them to hire managers under suggestions from their colleagues (62.3%) and to suggest managers (56.2%). Furthermore, 37% affirm that they adopt the strategy of recycling managers. Overall, we present evidence of the role of venture capitalists as human resources managers.
Econometric analysis gives support to the theoretical reasoning that the intensity with which venture capitalists locate managers through the network is positively influenced by the following factors: 1) the value of the information transmitted though the network; 2) the risk that venture capitalists assess of their investments; 3) the size of the fund; 4) how difficult is to entice executives to manage firms funded with venture capital; and 5) the gains that the venture capitalists who suggest managers can obtain when enticing managers to accept job offers. The decision to suggest managers is dominated by the risk of the investments in venture capitalists' portfolios and the gains that the venture capitalists who suggest managers can obtain when enticing managers to accept job offers.
The relevance of the value of the information in explaining why venture capitalists act on suggestions when hiring managers indicates that the quality and relevance of the information transmitted are among the motivations to network. Finally, the reputation of assisting efficient managers with job placement is significant in explaining the intensity with which venture capitalists suggest managers and act on suggestions when hiring managers. This last result is consistent with the conjecture that firms funded with venture capital have an advantage when hiring managers because venture capitalists can offer the manager an "insurance" for the case in which the manager is efficient but the project is not successful.
Theoretical and empirical arguments provided in this article support the conjecture that venture capitalists add value by bringing to their portfolio firms the capacity of attracting superior management. This indicates that human resources management is one of the keys to understanding the success of the venture capital industry. 
A The Model
This model starts assuming that the venture capitalist has access to a project. In order to undertake this project, the venture capitalist needs to hire a manager to lead it. We assume that each manager is characterized by his/her type θ, and that there are two possible types: good (θ = G) and bad (θ = B). Neither managers nor venture capitalists know beforehand managers' type. We also assume that there are two possible outcomes for the project, either a success or a failure, defining the value V of the project. In case of success V = S and in case of failure V = F, with F < 0 < S.
We denote by P Y X the conditional probability that the event X occurs given the occurrence of event Y . Assuming that the probability of success depends on the quality of the manager, we take accordingly P B S < P G S .
Managers can be chosen from different sources. Let ω denote the possible sources. In this model we assume that there are only two possible ways of locating managers: through search firms (ω = H) at a cost C H , and through the network (ω = N ) at a cost C N . While C H is the same for all venture capitalists, C N is assumed to vary according to venture capitalists' network connections. In particular, the relation between P N G and P H G depends on the belief that each venture capitalist has about the quality of the information transmitted through the network.
Managers have a reservation salary that is independent of their types. However, the reservation salary depends on his/her current employment status σ. If unemployed (σ = U ), the reservation salary is R. If employed (σ = E), the reservation salary is (1 + α)R, with α > 0. No assumption is made about the relative vales of P N E and P H E . The manager's expected future salary in her next job depends on whether the project succeeds. In the case of success, the expected future salary is W . It becomes M in case of failure. Accordingly, W > M. In case of project failure, venture capitalists who network can assist managers with job placement. With probability π, this assistance increases the manager's future salary by I. This assistance is assumed to be ineffective if the project succeeds.
By suggesting managers, venture capitalists are also assumed to incur a cost C D which varies according to venture capitalists' network connections.
Finally we assume that managers are risk-averse with utility function U and venture capitalists are risk neutral. Now that the exogenous structure was established, a possible procedure would be to specify under what conditions venture capitalists would either prefer to hire a headhunter or to network. We model the incentive to network as the payoff received by the venture capitalist when the network is used minus the payoff when a headhunter is hired.
In this model the venture capitalist decides first whether or not to participate in the network by hiring suggested managers. If suggested managers are hired, the venture capitalist can then choose between suggesting managers or not. Venture capitalists who actively suggest managers have an advantage when recruiting managers: managers would accept from these capitalists a salary below their reservation value, because capitalists' recommendations increase their expected future salary. This reduction in salary is assumed to be the venture capitalist' benefit from suggesting managers. Therefore, in case the venture capitalist suggests managers through the network, a manager's reservation salary should be discounted by a factor D. The manager's expected utility when the venture capitalist actively suggests managers is thus given by
reflecting the fact that the reservation salary is discounted by D and increased by I with probability π when the project fails. On the other hand, the manager's expected utility when the venture capitalist does not suggest managers is given by
The amount D represents the gain that the venture capitalists has by suggesting managers and is implicitly defined by the indifference of the manager:
34 Without loss of generality, we assume that the manager is unemployed.
The venture capitalist will suggest managers whenever the gain from this activity is larger than the cost associated with it, i.e., D > C D . Accordingly, the incentive to suggest managers is given by
Next we determine how the incentive to suggest managers varies as a function of the probability of failure, (1 − P S ), and the value of the assistance, I.
Proposition 1 The incentive to suggest managers increases with the risk of the project, 1 − P S .
Since
= 0, it then follows that, ceteris paribus, dD and dP S have opposite signs, or dD dP
Proposition 2 The incentive to suggest managers increases with the value of the assistance, I.
This result is proved in a similar way to the above result, leading to
The intuition of these results is straightforward. The value of the assistance depends on how effective it is. Since the assistance with job placement is effective only when the project fails, the higher the chances of failure, the higher the value managers attribute to the assistance, and the higher the discount on the reservation salary that they are willing to accept.
Next, we move to the decision of locating managers through the network. The expected payoff of venture capitalist who hire managers through the network is given by
if the venture capitalist suggest managers and
if the venture capitalist does not suggest managers, while the expected payoff of venture capitalists who hire through search firms is given by
Whenever expression (15) is negative and either (13) or (14) is positive, the project will be funded only by venture capitalists who network.
If the venture capitalist suggest managers, the incentive to locate managers through the network is given by the difference between (13) and (15) which equals
and if the venture capitalist does not suggest managers, the incentive to locate managers through the network is given by the difference between (14) and (15):
Expressions (16) and (17) shows that the incentive to take suggestions can be decomposed into four factors.
The term (S−F )(P
represents how much the venture capitalist values the improvement in the quality of managers when these latter are located through the network, vis-à-vis headhunters (informational gain). The underlying intuition is that locating a good manager is important only if, the difference in the productivity of managers (P 2. The term αR(P H E − P N E ) represents a gain (resp. loss), if managers located through the network present a lower (resp. higher) probability of being employed than those coming through headhunters. 4. Finally, the term D − C D stands for the gain that the venture capitalist can obtain by assisting managers with job placement as in (8).
Analysis of expressions (16) and (17) also leads to:
Proposition 3 Firms that would be funded by venture capitalists who network, but not by those who hire through search firms are more likely to be 1. firms that are very risky (projects where S − F is large); and 2. firms for which the difference in managers productivity is high.
Also, expressions (16) and (17) allows to conclude that Proposition 4 Firms that would be funded by venture capitalists who network, but not by those who hire through search firms are more likely to be funded by venture capitalists who 1. believe that managers coming through the network are significantly more efficient (P G S − P B S is large); and 2. have low networking costs.
We can now describe the interplay between the model and data 1. proposition SUCCESS DEPENDS ON MANAGERS is related to the differential in productivity (P
2. proposition SPECIAL SKILLS works as a proxy for the differential in the quality of managers (P
3. proposition DIFFICULT HIRE is related to the differential in reservation salaries (αR).
4. proposition REPUTATION is a proxy for the assessment that venture capitalists have of the value that managers attribute to the assistance with job placement I .
RISK is related to the term (S − F )
36 and to the probability of failure that managers assess (1 − P S ).
B Sample characteristics and possible biases
Given the characteristics of the sample, this appendix describes the procedure adopted and discusses the existence of possible biases.
B.1 Possible sampling biases
Most of the questions in the survey are used to explain the cross-sectional variation of the intensity with which venture capitalists network. Therefore, the average answer given to such questions are not a primary concern of this paper. However, this is not the case with the questions related to the intensity with which venture capitalists suggest managers to their colleagues (proposition SUGGEST), act on suggestions when hiring managers (proposition TAKE SUGGESTIONS), and believe that there exists a network (proposition NETWORK).
It is desirable to know how accurate the answers to these questions are and if the average answer is biased. This is because if only a very small proportion of venture capitalists network, then the network itself would not be relevant. The purpose of this section is to investigate the existence and relevance of possible biases.
The ideal condition to investigate the existence of biases would be to have detailed statistics about the population of venture capitalists. However, relevant personal information about individual venture capitalists is scarce. Therefore, the possibilities of controlling the sample are limited.
Venture Economics (1994) (refereed as VE from hereon) lists all the venture capital firms in the US. For each firm it lists the managers, whom to contact, the type of firm, the type of financing done by the firm, their specialization according to industry, geographical preference, year in which the venture capital firms were funded, and capital under management. The data on capital under management listed in VE, besides not covering all the firms, seems to be of little benefit. For example, it lists venture capital firms managed by several venture capitalists with as little capital under management as $2 million. Also, a comparison between the amount of capital some identified respondents gave and the amount listed in VE shows that the information about capital under management is not accurate.
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The remarks above make the data on capital under management listed in VE of little use in detecting possible biases.
Of the information available in VE, the type of financing venture capital firms are engaged in seems to be the only useful piece of information for controlling the sample. The survey examines the habits of venture capitalists as human resources managers. This issue seems to be more fundamental in early-stage financing (seed, startup, R&D, first-stage) since a venture capitalist would hardly think of funding a fast-growing firm without considering the eventual need to hire or replace key employees. Therefore, an over representation of early-stage financiers in the sample would not be surprising.
A second path for investigating the existence of biases uses the data available in the questionnaires. Venture capitalists were offered a summary of the main findings in the survey. They were also asked if they would be willing to answers a follow-up survey on the telephone. Weused this information to rank venture capitalists according to the interest they showed in the survey. It is possible that the interest venture capitalists showed is positively related to the intensity with which venture capitalists network. Therefore, this could be a source of bias to the average answer given to the questions related to the existence of the network. This path is pursued in section B.2.1.
B.2 Early-stage bias?
To gauge if there is there is a over-representation of early-stage financiers among the respondents, we compared the characteristics of the venture capitalists listed in VE, those in the mailing lists (879 venture capitalists), and the respondents (156), with respect to the type of financing they are dedicated to. We encountered difficulty in that there is not a list of types of financing for individual venture capitalists, only for firms. This is a problem because even though we can have a firm performing a wide range of types of financing, one of its venture capitalists may be specialized in a particular type. Since in the survey the respondents answered individually, it is meaningless to fully compare the sample with the set of venture capitalists listed in VE.
However, it is possible to compare the proportion of respondents that are dedicated to early-stage financing (those who included in their answers at least one early stage as one of the three most frequent) with the proportion of venture capitalists listed under firms that do at least one early-stage type of financing.
If the first proportion is greater, then we can conclude that early stage financiers have more incentive to answer the survey. This would generate a bias 38 toward the opinion of early stage financiers. The reverse of this proposition is not true.
VE lists nearly
39 2615 venture capital managers. 40 Among those, approximately 1934 (73.9%) are from firms that listed at least one early-stage type of financing.
In the mailing list 73.7% of the addresses were listed under firms that do earlystage financing. Among the respondents, 71.2% listed early stage types of financing. The similarity of these numbers indicates that neither the mailing list was overweighted towards early-stage financiers nor that these venture capitalists were more motivated to answer the survey. Therefore, there is no evidence of overrepresentation of early-stage financiers in this sample.
B.2.1 Bias due to the motivation of the respondents?
The interest different venture capitalists showed toward the survey can also be a source of bias. It is possible that venture capitalists who network or think that the network exists are more interested in the subject and, therefore, more likely to answer the survey. We measured the interest venture capitalists showed in the survey based on whether the respondent asked for a summary of the survey or agreed to participate through telephone interview.
The group of venture capitalists who agreed to a telephone interview is a subset of those who asked for the summary. This permitted the creation of a variable that capture the interest of the respondents on the object of the survey -variable INTEREST. This variable assumes value 1 for those who only answered the survey, 2 for those who asked for a summary of the main findings, and 3 for those who offered for a telephone interview. The crosstabulation of variable INTEREST and propositions SUGGEST, TAKE SUGGESTIONS, and NETWORK is presented in Table 14 . In these tables, the answers "agree" and "totally agree" are collapsed 41 into a single category "agreement." We repeated this procedure for answers "disagree" and "totally disagree" that were collapsed into the category "disagreement." As it can be seen, the average answers vary little with respect to variable INTEREST.
Pearson's chi-square statistics in Table 14 is a test of the independence between the row and column variables. These statistics gives no information about the sign of the relation, 39 The term nearly was used because of possible counting errors. Some firms have branches in different states. In this case, these firms are listed in all the states they have branches. Nonetheless, they are fully listed in only one state (in the other states there is a reference to the state where the full listing occurs). To avoid the problem of double counting, we counted only managers from firms where the full listing occurs. This does not avoid the double listing due to venture capitalists associated with different funds. However, the number of case in which this occurs is a very small.
40 For each firm there is a list of managers and a list of persons to contact. These two lists do not necessarily coincide. Since the survey is concerned with the habits of the people who structure deals, we used the list of managers, disregarding the list of persons to contact.
41 This was done to make Pearson's chi-square statistics reliable.
if it exists. To be reliable, this test requires the expected frequency of each cell to be greater than 1, and that at most 20% of the cells have the expected frequency less than 5. In none of the three tables the Chi-square statistics rejects the null hypotheses that the variables are independent. Nonetheless, the Chi-square statistics related to the variable NETWORK is not reliable since 44.4% of the cells have the expected frequency less than 5.
As an alternative procedure to detect a possible effect on the variable INTEREST, we ran a set of ordered probits using variable INTEREST as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are propositions SUGGEST, TAKE SUGGESTIONS, and NETWORK, and a constant. Table 15 summarizes the results of these regressions. As can be, seen none of the parameters estimated are significant (the highest t-value obtained was 0.686). Therefore, there is no evidence that the respondents' opinions about the network has any significant impact on the interest they showed in the survey.
In conclusion, the results of Pearson's chi-square statistics and ordered probit analysis in the sample do not yield any evidence that the interest venture capitalists showed in the survey was influenced by the attitude they have towards networking.
An alternative approach to detect biases due to non-respondents has been developed by Graham and Harvey (2001) . Typically they use the answers of late respondents as proxies for the non-respondents. We do not reproduce this approach here for simple lack of space. However, for the sake of completeness, we followed the same procedure, dividing the sample in three subgroups: those who answered in less than one week, between one and two weeks, and more than two weeks. We were not able to detect any trend that related time to respond and the given answers.
C Tables Table 1: Description of main variables in the tables PLACEMENT Number of executives the venture capitalist has employed more than once or helped with job placement in the previous 5 years.
REPLACEMENT
Number of CEOs replaced in the previous 5 years.
AVERAGE REPLACEMENT Obtained by dividing REPLACE-MENT by DEALS.
MANAGERS SUGGESTED
Number of managers that the venture capitalist had recommended to non-partners in the previous 5 years.
MANAGERS HIRED UNDER SUGGESTION
Number of managers that the venture capitalist had hired under suggestion from non-partners in the previous 5 years.
EARLY
Number of early-stage financing out of the three main types of financing.
RISK
Variable revealed answering the question : "in the realm of venture capital how would you classify most of your investments (use a scale from 1 for low risk to 5 for high risk." EXPERIENCE Number of years in the private equity industry.
CAPITAL Amount of capital under management.
DEALS
Number of deals made in the previous 5 years. a Some answers presented ties. In case two activities were tied in the first place, the second place was counted as blank. If three activities were tied in the first place, then the sencond and third places were left blank, and so on. a Some respondents gave intervals as answers. In such cases, the midpoint of the intervals was used. This is why PLACEMENT and REPLACEMENT may assume noninteger values. Once I learn about the good qualifications of a manager, I try to keep him/her working for companies I fund, i.e., I entice him/her to leave a firm when I sell or liquidate it and take a position in another company I fund. 
SUCCESS DEPENDS ON MANAGERS
The success of the type of firms I fund depends mostly on their top managers.
SPECIAL SKILLS
To manage a firm funded with venture capital requires different skills from those needed to manage a company funded with other sources of capital.
αR
DIFFICULT HIRE
It can be difficult to entice a top manager to leave a stable position in a well established company and take a chance in a new firm with risky prospects.
I REPUTATION
Having a reputation of helping good managers with job placement, in the event that the companies for which they work are liquidated, helps entice other managers to work for other firms I fund.
S − F and (1 − P S ) RISK in the realm of venture capital, how would you classify most of your investments (use a scale from 1 for low risk to 5 for high risk)? Estimates are from ordered probit analysis. The dependent variable is the agreement to the proposition "it is common for me to act on suggestions from other is the private equity industry when hiring senior managers." Its values ranges from 0 for totally disagree to 4 for totally agree.
Control
Model 1 Effects on the intensity of networking: suggesting managers.
Estimates are from ordered probit analysis. The dependent variable is the agreement to the proposition "it is common for me to suggest likely managers to others in the private equity industry." Its values ranges from 0 for totally disagree to 4 for totally agree. Values in parentheses are t-statistics.
Model 1 29.50 * * * * * * Significant at the 1% level. * * Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
